In presenting economic puzzles, I have three goals in mind: some puzzles are chosen to stimulate research; others offer examples that will help undergraduate and graduate teaching; all should provide quality distractions during seminars. As usual, this feature begins with several speed puzzles; answers can be found at the end of the problems. Following are several longer puzzles, for which readers are invited -nay, challenged, to submit their own answers. The puzzles in this issue focus on betting and voting, and once again include a prisoners' dilemma problem. The column ends with reader mail, including the submitted solutions to "The Best Location in Manhattan," Puzzle 4 in the Summer
(i.e., I call heads and you call tails). And when we match, you give me $2 to make it even." At this point you do a little figuring. On the basis of pure chance, which would apply if this were actual coin tossing, the offer is fair enough. In the long run, out of each four tosses you would win $3 once and $1 once and lose $2 twice, for an even break. Abraham Neyman offers the following twist on the prisoners' dilemma. This provides a good test for your understanding of game theory. It is well known that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. It is also true that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. How is this argument different from that of subgame perfection?
If you play against
Answers to Puzzles 1, 2, and 3 appear following Puzzle 5.
Puzzle 4: The Other Person's Envelope is Always Greener
You have two envelopes. In one, you place a hidden amount of money and give the envelope to Ali. Then you flip a hidden coin. If it comes up heads, you place twice the original amount of money in the second envelope. If it comes up tails you only put half the original in the second envelope. You give this second envelope to Baba. So far, the contents of both envelopes are hidden, as is the outcome of the coin toss. Ali and Baba are allowed to look privately at the amount of money in their own envelopes. They are then given an opportunity to trade envelopes if they both agree.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Ali finds $10.00 in her envelope. Ali reasons that Baba is equally likely to have $5.00 or $20.00. Trading envelopes gives her an expected gain of $2.50 (or 25 percent). Acting in a risk-neutral manner, she would want to switch. Now Baba looks inside his envelope. Whatever amount he finds (either $5.00 or $20.00), he too reasons that Ali is equally likely to have half or double his amount. The expectation is 0.5[0.5X + 2X] = 1.25X, so he too expects a 25 percent gain from switching envelopes.
But this is paradoxical. The sum of the amounts in the envelopes is whatever it is. Trading envelopes simply cannot make both students better off. Yet they both expect to make a 25 percent gain. Where did they go wrong? I learned about this puzzle from Hal Varian who heard it from S. Zabell at Northwestern who heard it from Steve Budrys of the Odesta Corporation. Although it may not have originated with Budrys, this is as far back as we have been able to trace it. I would be delighted to hear more about the history of this puzzle. My telling above involves a slight variation on the "original" version, where there is no coin toss. We are simply told that one envelope is twice as nice as the other, but not which is which. So before the envelopes are handed out, the two students should be indifferent as to which they get. But once they open their envelopes, each appears to be eager to trade with the other. Just as above, both expect a 25 percent return from the trade. In fact, even before they look in their envelope, they both want to trade. How can that be? For those readers who are impatient, Zabell (1987) provides a short exposition of the puzzle and his proposed solution. I will discuss his and your solutions in a later column. Schelling describes the set-up: "A five-man board is to elect one of its members chairman by a procedure involving successive majority votes. Anderson, first in alphabetical order, will be paired against Barnes; the winner of that vote will be paired against Carlson, the winner then paired against Davis, and the winner of that paired against Evans. The winner of this fourth and final ballot will be declared chairman.
Everyone knows everyone else's preferences. Everyone wants to be chairman. Landau demonstrated the existence of a Chicken King in the sense that this chicken can beat (up) every other chicken either directly or via some third chicken. In particular, the chicken which beats up the greatest number of other chickens has this property. The proof is straightforward. Call the chicken which beats the most other chickens K. If K beats all other chickens then we are done. If K loses to some chicken L then it must be the case that K beats something which beats L. Otherwise, L would beat everything K beats and K too: this would give L more victories than K, contradicting the assumption that no chicken has more victories than K.
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Returning to the question of ranking social alternatives, Nicholas Miller (1980) offers an elegant solution in his article on the uncovered set. Miller defines the "Cover" relationship by A covers B if (1) A beats B in a pairwise majority vote and (2) A also beats everything that B beats (in pairwise majority votes). Miller shows that this covering relationship is transitive; if A covers B and B covers C this implies that A covers C. Since a transitive relationship cannot cycle in any finite collection of alternatives, there must be at least one "Uncovered" proposition. I leave it to the reader to show that a proposal uncovered by anything else has the "Chicken King" property, namely it beats everything else either directly or in one step.
The importance of the uncovered set goes beyond the existence of a "Chicken King." As emphasized by Ordershook (1986) it allows us to restrict the problem of social choice to the set of uncovered proposals; why pick B if A covers B? Although this may not reduce the choice to a singleton, it is a stronger selection criteria than the Pareto principle alone. Second, Miller (1980) demonstrates that sophisticated voting under amendment procedure can never lead to an outcome outside the uncovered set. Hence, the ability to manipulate an agenda is restricted to the set of alternatives that are uncovered.
Answer to Puzzle 3
First, the subgame perfection argument. In the final period, there is a unique Nash equilibrium: both players defect. Hence behavior in the penultimate period cannot affect the final play, so again both players should defect. And so it goes.
The Nash argument is more subtle. Again, at the final period both players must defect in the Nash equilibrium outcome. But that does not immediately imply that in the penultimate period both players must defect in any Nash equilibrium outcome. If in the penultimate period, player 1 deviates from the predicted equilibrium behavior, player 2 is no longer required to behave rationally in final period. But in the prisoners' dilemma example, there is nothing worse that he can do than defect. Player 2's equilibrium strategy already minimizes player l's final period payoff. There is no off-equilibrium punishment that can be used to generate cooperation in earlier periods.
This difference is easier to see in Table 1 where the prisoners' dilemma is expanded to include a third strategy, mutual destruction (confession to a crime that will give both prisoners the death penalty). Mutual destruction is clearly a dominated strategy and will never be played in any subgame perfect equilibrium. But in a Nash equilibrium, the prisoners could use this "incredible" threat of mutual destruction to sustain cooperation in all but the last period of a finite repetition of the game above. This is accomplished by the pair of equilibrium strategies: cooperate in period t + 1 if the other has cooperated in periods 1 to t, else mutual destruction. . In general, we could not 'diamond' them, leaving all the other markets the same. But let's suppose that we could. Now consider any pair of diamond markets with unequal area. We could again reduce total and hence average distance if we could produce identical diamond markets for them (leaving all other markets the same), since total distance from a firm with a diamond market with side Y is V2 Y 3/3, which is a convex function of Y. Again, we could not obviously produce the identical diamond market areas, but suppose that we could. Replication of the 'diamonds of une'qual sizes' argument leads us in a series of imagined steps, each of which reduces average distance, to the conclusion that all diamond market areas must be identical. We can, of course, implement this configuration."
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More on A nswer to Puzzle 2: In Fact, It's a Gas. The controversy over the leaded-unleaded gasoline price differential continues. John Lott Jr. (Rice University) and Russell Roberts (UCLA) write to offer an alternative explanation of the price premium for unleaded gasoline that does not depend on differing price elasticities nor loss leader effects. They argue that the price differential is due to gasoline stations attempting to cover their fixed costs such as checking the oil, turning on the pump, making change, and so on. Consumers of leaded gas typically have cars with bigger gasoline tanks since their cars are older and less fuel efficient. Since their purchases are bigger, the fixed cost can be covered with a smaller mark-up on the larger transaction. They draw an interesting analogy to price discrimination in restaurants. "The most important factor explaining the retail over wholesale mark-up in a restaurant is the time it takes to eat an item. This explains why wine and coffee are priced seemingly so far above 'marginal cost.' People linger over these items, so their price must include the cost of renting the table." While I find the restaurant analogy helpful, I think their explanation is not entirely convincing. If the markup on coffee is an attempt to cover the rental cost of a table, why then are refills typically free and why is there no discount for take out? As for gasoline, the fixed cost associated with self-service must be lower. This would imply a smaller price differential between grades at the unleaded pumps. Is that true? Lott and Roberts are aware of these issues and have promised to drive from coffee shop to gas station until they find the answer.
As for New Jersey, Burt Malkiel (Yale) recalls the legislative debate when self-service gasoline was outlawed. The "argument" was that self-service pumps discriminate against women.
More on Puzzle 1: Turn Out the Lights. Peter Albin (CUNY-John Jay College) asked if he "might shed additional darkness on Puzzle 1 before Consolidated Edison takes the matter as settled doctrine and mails out my priority vouchers." The problem with the solution as given is that it requires that brownouts have no significant rationing or signalling effects on their own. This might not be the case if in the event of a brownout "certain equipment is turned off entirely because it cannot function if plug current does not meet design specifications: e.g. computers without independent power supplies are switched off." Since the priority system might allow others to continue using their computers, this could exacerbate the total shortage. "Although the net value of transferred priority vouchers will always be zero, the status need not be quo." I plead guilty as charged. * Behind the scenes Carl Shapiro and Timothy Taylor have been improving the puzzles and the answers. Thomas Schelling at Harvard's JFK School has been kind enough to share this paradox of the departing voter. The idea of an "uncovered set" is based on an article by Nicholas Miller (1980). Finally, many thanks to all of those writing in with answers and new puzzles.
